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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
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Articles

Zambia: Tension Between Labor and Government

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Relations between Zambia's independent labor movement and President Kaunda's ruling United National Independence Party have deteriorated as a result of the country's economic crisis. In addition, labor leaders are now under pressure from rank-and-file members who believe the current union leadership no longer adequately represents their interests. Tensions between labor and the government, as well as intraunion frictions, are likely to continue because of Lusaka's acceptance of harsh IMF-requested austerity measures designed to put Zambia's failing economy on sound financial footing.

The Faltering Economy

Zambia's economy is struggling after nearly a decade of decline caused by falling prices for copper exports, which accounts for 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings. President Kaunda announced last November an accelerated effort to deal with the continuing economic crisis, as inflation topped 25 percent, real GDP continued to fall and unemployment approached 50 percent, according to press and US Embassy reporting.

Kaunda has committed his government to reduce dependence on copper exports by raising food prices and is calling for massive foreign investment in agriculture, to encourage farm production and exports. These policies, however, have deprived Zambia's manufacturing sector of scarce foreign exchange needed to purchase critical inputs contributing to a slowdown of industrial output that is causing industry to operate at about 40 percent of capacity. In addition, the IMF has called for further stringent measures, including devaluation of the national currency. Official figures show the average Zambian's purchasing power sank to 27 percent of its 1975 value by mid-1984.

In the face of rising inflation the unions have staged several wildcat strikes to force the government and industries to negotiate pay hikes, according to US Embassy reporting. Although the unions were successful in securing wage increases in the past, dwindling economic resources have made the government less cooperative than before.

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Recent Strikes

Lusaka's concern over wildcat strikes mounted when some medical personnel walked off the job and others instituted a work slowdown in January. Kaunda responded by declaring medical employees "essential personnel" and liable to criminal charges under the Preservation of Public Security Act, according to Embassy reporting. Similarly, in February, Lusaka declared workers in health, water supply, food and fuel distribution, mines, and transport employees "essential personnel," as financial workers, teachers, and post and telecommunications service employees also went on strike. At the same time, the government passed additional regulations declaring that the automatic deduction of union dues¹ by employers would be revoked when a union stages an illegal strike.

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Despite Lusaka's tough actions, mineworkers staged a wildcat strike in early June to protest pay and benefits. In a week about 57,000 miners were on strike, resulting in the closure of nearly all the copper

¹ Union dues are deducted by employers and forwarded to the union and the ZCTU. The ZCTU chairman recently said that, without the mandatory deductions by employers, the unions could not exist financially, according to Embassy reports. The inability to get workers to pay their own dues directly to their union makes the ZCTU extremely vulnerable to government efforts to decrease the independence of the labor movement.

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***The Zambian Congress of
Trade Unions***

The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) developed from a strong labor movement that predated Zambian independence. Beginning in the 1920s, black workers—especially black miners—made sporadic attempts to organize against white employers. Major strikes by the miners in 1935 and 1940 over pay and working conditions helped to instill a political awareness that later fueled the nationalist campaign to end British colonial rule in what was then Northern Rhodesia. Following independence, President Kaunda dissolved the existing trade union federation and created the ZCTU in 1965 to act as an umbrella organization in an attempt to make the unions more responsive to the wishes of the ruling party.

The Trade Unions and Trades Dispute Ordinance established the ZCTU and defined the powers of the unions. The Minister of Labor appoints the ZCTU officers and also has the authority to dissolve the ZCTU without challenge. According to the law, an industry or trade can only be represented by one union. Each union elects a chairman, who must be a member of the union that elects him for at least three years prior to his election. Each union chairman is

then a member of the ZCTU Supreme Committee, which is charged with the responsibility for settling disputes between labor and management. Under the legislation, strikes are permitted only for specific reasons and only after all other methods of settling disputes have been exhausted.

Despite the ZCTU's, and its member unions' legal subordination to the government, the unions repeatedly have defied the ruling party and its policies. In an attempt to reduce friction between the unions and the government, Kaunda sought in 1982 to include the ZCTU leadership in the decisionmaking process by appointing five labor leaders to serve on the boards of parastatal organizations. The effort, however, failed to co-opt the ZCTU leadership and the unions have, so far, been able to avoid absorption into the governmental bureaucracy. Nevertheless, in recent years the ZCTU has only been able to gain minimal wage increases and the ensuing wildcat strikes have further eroded its ability to act as an effective spokesman between organized labor and the government.

mines. Although the government did not charge the miners with a violation under the Preservation of Security Act, over 4,000 workers were fired, causing the collapse of the strike on 7 June. By designating the workers as "essential" and threatening revocation of automatic dues payments, the government weakened the options of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) leadership in achieving labor objectives.

Prospects


We believe government and labor tensions are likely to escalate as Kaunda attempts to balance the demands of labor with his desire to undertake economic reforms. As Lusaka moves toward implementing tough economic reforms sought by the IMF, Zambian workers face declining real wages and

additional confrontations between the government and the unions are likely. Moreover, major concessions to the unions by Lusaka would jeopardize the IMF austerity program and offer only a temporary respite from labor confrontations.

The ZCTU leadership, for its part, will be unable to prevent individual unions from undertaking unilateral job actions, in our view, as rank-and-file frustrations grow. Efforts by some ruling party members to bring the labor movement under the direct control of the party are unlikely to be effective. The ZCTU already is unable to enforce its own policies and it is doubtful that the government will fare any better.

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*Zambian Congress of Trade Unions,
Distribution of Membership*



The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions has a membership of between 170,000 and 200,000 workers. Membership has dropped in the last five years, due to recession and unemployment. Only the approximately 57,000-member Zambia Miners Union constitutes a notable bloc outside the ZCTU.

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Labor Personalities**Frederick Chiluba**

Frederick Chiluba, a candid, dynamic, and effective labor official, has served as chairman of the ZCTU, since 1974. Chiluba, outspokenly pro-Western and frequently critical of socialist schemes and of many of the economic policies of President Kenneth Kaunda, harbors political aspirations, according to US diplomats. He has, however, avoided personal attack on the popular Kaunda and has emphasized the joint efforts of the ZCTU and the government to develop the country. Kaunda, encouraged by hardline members of the ruling party, has long been suspicious of Chiluba and the ZCTU and has threatened, during several periods of labor tension, to end the federation independence by incorporating it into the party. In 1981, Kaunda detained Chiluba and several other ZCTU officials for three months during one such period of unrest. Chiluba has supported moderate policies throughout the current labor crisis, probably to avoid another crackdown.

Newstead Zimba

Newstead Zimba has served as general secretary of the ZCTU since 1974. A loyal lieutenant to ZCTU chairman Chiluba, Zimba is an experienced, respected, and active trade union leader, who has criticized Kaunda's threats to incorporate the ZCTU into the ruling party, as well as the President's economic policies. He was detained for several months in 1981 during a period of labor unrest.

Zimba, educated locally, was a teacher in Zambian schools from 1959 until 1971, when he was elected president of the National Union of Teachers. He served as president of the ZCTU from 1971 until 1974 and was a member of Parliament from 1978 until 1981. Zimba, 48, belongs to the Tumbuka ethnic group. (U)

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Increased militancy on the part of the unions will slow attempts by Kaunda to institute economic reforms, but is unlikely, in our judgment, to threaten the stability of the regime in the near term. Militant union activity, including wildcat strikes and perhaps sabotage incidents, however, could act as a catalyst to

cement popular dissatisfaction with Kaunda over the long term, thus posing an indirect threat to the government.

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Lesotho: Election Prospects

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After years of delay by Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan, Lesotho is preparing for its first elections since 1970, although a date has not been announced. Jonathan is convinced he must hold elections to avoid losing Western assistance, [redacted]

however, that the elections will not take place until it is clear the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) will achieve a landslide victory, [redacted]

[redacted] Jonathan already has taken several steps in an attempt to frustrate the opposition and increase popular support for the BNP—including granting government employees their first major salary increase since 1975. South Africa is openly funding several opposition parties, but probably cannot affect the outcome of the elections. [redacted]

Preelection Maneuvering

The BNP in the past year has established special electoral rules and procedures that strongly favor it, according to the US Embassy. Each candidate must pay a new registration deposit of \$500 and be sponsored by 500 constituents. In addition, district elections may be held on different days, a provision many observers believe will allow the party's militant youth wing—the BNP Youth League—time to move from poll to poll to intimidate voters. [redacted]

[redacted] these requirements are likely to prevent all but the wealthiest and best known opposition figures from running, [redacted] Most observers believe that even the largest opposition party cannot raise the money or gather enough signatures to field more than a handful of candidates for the 60 parliamentary seats. One party even has approached the US Embassy for funds. Moreover, Jonathan has publicly discouraged the Basotho—the primary tribal grouping in Lesotho—from sponsoring opposition candidates. In addition, the Embassy reports that opposition figures have been denied access to the government-controlled media. [redacted]

Profile of the Government

Democratically elected in 1965, Jonathan and the BNP have ruled Lesotho without recourse to elections since 1970, when Jonathan declared the results of the first postindependence vote null and void because he was losing, and suspended the constitution. Although Jonathan announced his intention to hold elections in 1981, a framework for the vote was not put forward until 1983. [redacted]

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The Parliament Bill of 1983, intended to act as a constitution, eliminated several provisions of the British-drafted constitution promulgated by Lesotho's 1966 independence order that limited the power of the prime minister. The new constitution completely eliminates the ability of the king or the traditional chiefs to block legislation. Under the new provisions, the king must assent to any bill presented to him, and the prime minister may assent for him should he fail to do so. Although the king is still vested with executive authority, in reality he has no power independent of the prime minister. [redacted]

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The government asserts that traditional democratic practices are preserved through the holding of mass public meetings. In practice, however, dissent is rarely aired at these government-orchestrated gatherings, according to US Embassy reporting. The government also emphasizes respect for the tribal chieftancy system, which extends from village chiefs to district chiefs and finally the king, although this system plays little role in the decisionmaking process and serves primarily to elicit public support for decisions already made by the Jonathan government. [redacted]

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Leabua Jonathan

Leabua Jonathan, founder and leader of the ruling Basotho National Party, has been Prime Minister since 1965 and Minister of Defense since 1967. A savvy, tough politician, Jonathan maintains a firm grip on the country through his control of the government apparatus and the security services. He has retained power through arbitrary legislation and the intimidation and/or imprisonment of political opponents. He survived an attempted coup in 1974 and an assassination attempt in 1983. []

Jonathan, a member of Lesotho's royal house of Molapo, was educated locally. After working in the gold mines of South Africa in his early twenties, he returned home in 1937 to work as a local administrator. He has been involved in politics since that time and played a key role in the negotiations that resulted in Lesotho's independence in 1966.

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Jonathan apparently has resorted to even harsher measures to intimidate his opposition. A government official has admitted that the Army, under direct orders from the Prime Minister, has threatened potential sponsors of opposition candidates in numerous villages, []

Jonathan also has taken steps to arm Youth League members and plans to have them to guard the polling booths, []

[] The US Embassy reports, however, that voter registration has proceeded in an orderly fashion, although opposition leaders have complained about Youth League members disrupting their political rallies. []

A Weak and Divided Opposition

Halfhearted efforts to forge a united front against the BNP have accomplished little, with the exception of a joint action committee to investigate the possibility of fielding a common slate of candidates. While opposition leaders agree on the necessity of removing Jonathan from office and steering Lesotho back onto

a strict anti-Communist course,¹ personality conflicts have prevented anything more than general discussion, according to US Embassy reporting. []

Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The BCP, by far the largest opposition party in Lesotho and winner of the voided 1970 elections, is weakened by its division into four factions. One faction, which participates in the interim national assembly appointed by Jonathan, is viewed by other BCP members as traitorous. A second faction, led by secretary general Godfrey Kolisang, has reversed its stance of nonparticipation in the government, and has decided to contest the elections. []

¹ Jonathan alienated a large segment of the population when he allowed the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea to open embassies in Maseru in 1983. []

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Ntsu Mokhehle

Ntsu Mokhehle, an African nationalist with leftist sympathies, is the founder and leader of Lesotho's most important opposition group, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and commander of its military wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army. In exile since a failed coup attempt in 1974, Mokhehle is the only opposition figure with any significant support, according to US Embassy reporting. Mokhehle's long absence from Lesotho, however, has hurt local BCP organization and has led many younger Basotho to regard him primarily as a historical figure. [redacted]



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Mokhehle, 66, has a degree in zoology from South Africa's Fort Hare University. Politically active since the early 1940s, he played an important role in the negotiations that led to his country's independence in 1966. [redacted]

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Two other factions operate in exile. Ntsu Mokhehle—the former leader of the BCP and, in our view, the only viable opposition figure—heads one faction. We believe that Mokhehle's endorsement is critical for those Basotho who voted for the BCP in 1970. Mokhehle has condemned the elections as a one-sided exercise designed to entrench Jonathan in power, and has denied that Kolisang has any right to represent the party, according to US Embassy sources. Rather than participate in elections, Mokhehle has called for a meeting with Jonathan to restore the 1966 constitution and form a coalition government. Although Jonathan has indicated a willingness to

meet with Mokhehle and allow his return from exile, most observers consider this a ploy to co-opt him.



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Mokhehle also heads the BCP's military wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army, which in the past has received funding and support from South Africa for its attacks on the Jonathan regime. The current improvement in Lesotho-South African relations, however, has led Basotho exiles to conclude that

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South Africa has shifted tactics away from guerrilla-based intimidation of Maseru in favor of political pressures, [] as the South Africans have cut off funds and logistic support. One of the exile-based factions renounces violence as a political tool. []

Basotho Democratic Alliance (BDA). Formed and supported financially by Pretoria in early 1984, the BDA is strongly anti-Communist, but has disappointed its founder's plans to form a united opposition front. []

[] the BDA has failed to gain significant support from the Lesotho population and its leaders are not representative of the party. According to US Embassy reporting, the party's leaders have been discredited by their ties to Pretoria, and are considered by many Basotho to be unprincipled opportunists. []

Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP). The primary goal of the MFP has been to return the king to power. The party was founded in the mid-1960s, but has remained small and is not a threat to the Jonathan regime, in our view. In early 1984, however, a senior government official was concerned about reports of South African support to the MFP, []

[] The official said that Pretoria had purchased 30 vehicles for the MFP, which doled them out to tribal chiefs in the villages. []

United Democratic Party (UDP). Party leader C. D. Mofeli is openly pro-South African, according to the US Embassy. The UDP opposes the presence of ANC activists in Lesotho, and, according to press reports, Mofeli has claimed that the raid against ANC targets in Maseru by South African security forces in December 1982 was a justified preemptive act. Mofeli has complained to US Embassy officers that funding from Pretoria had diminished since the formation of the BDA. []

National Independence Party (NIP). Lesotho's newest political party, the NIP, espouses anti-Communism and peaceful coexistence with South Africa. Its founder, A. C. Manyeli, was a cofounder of the BNP and a former minister in the Jonathan government. Although Manyeli is extremely influential within the

Catholic community, the NIP has not attracted wide support since forming in December 1984, according to US Embassy reporting. []

Outlook

We believe that none of the opposition parties or politicians now active in Lesotho, or any combination thereof, is capable of defeating Jonathan. The opposition remains weak and divided and, in our judgment, unable to put forward a credible candidate, even though Jonathan's regime is unpopular with many Basotho, and despite South African help. We believe that only Mokhehle, by virtue of his charisma and residual popularity, would have an outside chance of defeating Jonathan, yet Mokhehle is unlikely to participate in the elections. []

The most serious challenge may arise out of conflicts within Jonathan's own party. []

Although Jonathan allowed the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea to open embassies in Maseru in 1983, recently he has played down his new ties to the Communists to avoid further alienating Lesotho's large anti-Communist Catholic population. A senior minister in Jonathan's cabinet has reported to US Embassy officers that a major split is developing in the BNP along East-West lines. It is unlikely, however, that the leftist faction could garner sufficient support to remove Jonathan. []

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**Africa
Briefs**

Mali**Traore Under Pressure**

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President Moussa Traore, who was reelected last month to another six-year term, is likely to face mounting public pressure to resolve the drought-ridden country's serious food shortages. The US Embassy in Bamako reports that some 1.4 million people—about 20 percent of the 7.7 million population—are at risk of starvation and the numbers are growing. The Embassy indicates that there is currently a 200,000-million-ton food deficit, and serious shortages are expected until the harvest in October. Although the fall crop may help ease the immediate crisis if the rains due this month prove adequate, seed shortages, migration of farmers to urban areas, and a dangerously reduced water table almost certainly will make recovery from the drought a long and difficult process.

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The military occasionally grumbles over the lack of improvement in the country's economic and drought problems, but remains Traore's strongest support, according to US Embassy reports. While Traore has experienced some shaky periods in his 16 years in power, we believe he is in control for now and faces no immediate threat. If economic and drought challenges go unmet, however, Traore's support almost certainly will erode and the possibility of a coup or assassination attempt will grow.

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In our view, Traore is likely to continue his tentative rapprochement with the West, particularly with France, the former colonial power, in search of reliable sources of military, economic, and emergency food assistance. Bamako has been working to reduce the country's longstanding dependence on the USSR because of the poor quality of Soviet military training and supplies and Moscow's stingy response to the country's food needs. We believe that occasional tensions with the USSR are likely to continue because of periodic effort by the Soviets to stem Mali's turn to the West. According to the US Embassy, Bamako accused two Soviet diplomats last year of encouraging university student demonstrations against the regime. Moscow has tried to infiltrate the Mali Peace Movement, a principal point of contact outside of the government for the Soviets.

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Seychelles**Delay on Soviet-Built Drydock Facilities** [REDACTED]

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The Rene regime has not moved on a Soviet offer to construct a floating drydock ship repair facility on the main island of Mahe, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Soviets last summer told Rene they could build drydock facilities for Seychellois use near the local naval base at Port Victoria and, pending the results of a Soviet hydrographic survey, on a small outlying island. Construction at Port Victoria reportedly was to begin earlier this year but, [REDACTED] no work has been done because negotiations over the location stalled when Seychelles defense officials decided to build the facility at a site the Soviets say is unsuitable. The impasse comes at a time when Seychelles is launching an ambitious national development plan and is looking to the West and moderate Arab countries for badly needed financial backing. [REDACTED]

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